Theoretical Applications 

Does intelligence sharing and coordination in covert action constitute cooperation? This question in central to applying theory to this type of political behavior. Stephan Krasner’s definition of international regime (1983) applies on many levels. He defines a regime as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations." According to liberal institutionalism, intelligence cooperation is facilitated by a nexus of common interests among states, which produces intimate cooperation. The strength of cooperation is often a function of time. ECHELON is a fair example where interest in defeating Nazi Germany originally created the intelligence sharing network and the relationship solidifies throughout the Cold War until today, when legal doctrine governs procedures and proper instances where sharing is allowed, necessary or subject to the quid pro quo. Few would argue against the unprecedented level of cooperation between the U.S. and the U.K. on this level.

Few mechanisms are in place that allow for useful measure of regime effectiveness in covert cooperation; such is the nature of the intelligence community that information about alliances are kept secret until they are either leaked by enterprising reporters, declassified or, as in the case of Operation Condor, discovered by academia deep in the files of a South American intelligence service. Effectiveness is central to definition of intelligence cooperation that incorporates regime theory. As outlined by Oran R. Young (1994) effectiveness is the extent to which members of the regime remain congruent in their conception of norms and rules. A regime must also obtain certain expected objectives that are to the enrichment of its members. On the issue of intelligence cooperation, effectiveness is the measure to which government agencies coordinate efforts for measured gains in security. Gains represent increased knowledge against a possible threat or progress against a specific target. An intelligence cooperation regime must also be “robust” and able to withstand changes in international politics or shifts of relative power in states both within and outside of the regime (Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997).

The extent to which intelligence regimes are created, maintained and survive over time has not been studied yet but would offer substantial increase in knowledge at a time when cooperation is becoming important to effective maintenance of national security. Some important questions about the potential capabilities that states can bring to bare on transnational threats, best practices to maintain an effective intelligence regime, increasing level of trust among partners and ensuring cooperation in the future will reveal methods and patterns to help the policy-maker predict how intelligence agencies combine efforts.

As the common threat diminished the question slowly emerged of how to approach a relatively peaceful next stage for ASEAN countries. Over the years, militaries became familiar with their counterparts. Singapore, whose lack of territory and sizable military required additional space, was establishing military bases in Malaysia and the Philippines. Thailand and Malaysia have enjoy a cordial relationship between defense departments after their joint initiative to combat the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM) throughout the 1970’s and 80’s. As insurgency decreased the level of joint intelligence sharing and cooperation increased and intense bilateral defense arrangements were created that facilitated collaboration among intelligence agencies (Acharya 1991). These arrangements also displayed a high degree of robustness. The Prime Minister of Malaysia in 1981, Mahatir Mohammad, said that the relationship with Singapore was healthy between “the security apparatuses of our two societies…against any subversive and criminal elements that could affect our stability even when political leaders were openly squabbling” (Acharya 1991).

Additionally, since the 1970’s ASEAN nations held annual intelligence summits for the heads of member intelligence services. These meetings continue today and are designed to provide a venue for the exchange of ideas and security issues (Acharya 1991). It should be noted, however, that in none of the literature on ASEAN intelligence cooperation is there a relationship that exists among intelligence agencies that does not already exist militarily. One could conclude that intelligence sharing and cooperative covert action only exists if military ties are first established and maintained over time. Acharya (2002) mentions briefly that in the case of ASEAN and its creation in the late 1960’s it was intelligence officials that made “first contact” and from those first beginnings it became a regional collective security organization that it is today. The role of intelligence sharing seems tautological with inconclusive literature on the issue of whether broader military-security issues give rise to intelligence cooperation or if intelligence personnel are the first to make contact and establish a level of trust necessary for the formation of larger collective security structures. 

Richard Stubbs (1992) would agree with Archarya on the issue of ASEAN nations turning increasingly to intelligence sharing with the demise if CPM and other communist insurgent activity. He adds that ASEAN intelligence cooperation is a primary result of a collective fear among member of internal subversion dating back to the anti-communist era. He also adds that covert action is coordinated in the economic sector where ASEAN nations have established a “joint defense industrial sector” for the procurement, sale and distribution of armaments (Stubbs 1991). The national intelligence agencies of Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore began meeting on an informal bases in the 1980’s to coordinate the movement of military capital to areas of high guerilla activity along joint border. Whether the high level meetings that Acharya (2002) discusses are the same as those mentioned by Stubbs (1991) is indeterminable.

Technology has further strengthened intelligence cooperation in ASEAN countries. Malaysia and Singapore gained the ability in the early 1990’s to monitor maritime traffic throughout the South China Sea electronically and through the joint border security arrangement are able to share the information freely. ASEAN nations have also expanded the reach of their collective security arrangement and subsequently their intelligence partners as well. The Five Powers Defense Arrangement (FPDA) includes Australia, Great Britain and New Zealand in a cooperative military framework with Singapore and Malaysia. This framework includes intelligence sharing.

The mechanisms at work with the increased intelligence cooperation in Southeast Asia appears to be driven by the interactive effects between joint security arrangements, regional insecurity and joint bilateral defense activities. It is unclear in the literature what the combined effects of these forces are. Do they build upon each other to create strong intelligence cooperation regimes? It would appear that is not the case since Acharya (2002) mentions that intelligence officials may have been the first ambassadors to future collective security partners. Does intelligence cooperation exist in the nexus between these three forces? A look at other intelligence regimes implies that they can exist completely for clandestine operations.

There is also documented evidence of US involvement in Operation Condor. As right-wing governments in Latin America consolidated power they eliminated opposition to their rule. These opposition groups were often communist. During the Cold War the U.S. was intimately involved in reducing the threat of communism in Latin America and records show that the CIA and the FBI were aware of the operation’s beginnings. At the meeting in November 1975 leaders of the intelligence services created a plan of action against communist insurgency as well as an organizational structure. Security procedures for clandestine operations were also organized. It was agreed that the headquarters would be based in Santiago. Operational doctrine came from early US Special Forces manuals developed since WWII (McSherry 2002, 43). Tactics included counter-guerilla warfare and anti-terrorist strategies. Condor operators relied heavily on assassination and abduction in many situations. Another program called the School of the Americas, run by the US Army’s Foreign Military Assistance Program, taught Latin American military officers tactics in torture, interrogation, hypnosis, sensory deprivation and assassinations. According to the terror files, the same curriculum at the School of the America’s was trickling into covert operations doctrine. As a regime, Operation Condor was effective in maintaining clarity in its message and forward momentum on mutual security concerns. It was also effective in standardizing norms across member states.

A different part of Condor involved efficiently disseminating intelligence information. Advanced computer technology applied with US help fulfilled the demand for quick alerts on enemy movement. Since Vietnam, the CIA used computers to maintain data on all aspects of the Vietcong. Known as Operation Phoenix, it was meant to aid counter-insurgency warfare by keeping records on individuals who may be involved in helping the enemy. In exchange for their help providing telecommunications for Condor the CIA was well informed on the operations (McSherry 2002, 46). As much as Condor was a Latin American organization it incorporated U.S. expertise and took advantage of the U.S. initiative in combating communism. In many ways US/Condor collaboration was the start of a long intelligence relationship.

Compared to ASEAN, Condor is similar. Both were created to combat transnational insurgency. Common threats create common allies in a struggle against subversive groups. Intelligence personnel on the front lines benefited from cooperation between intelligence agencies (McSherry 2002, 46). Over time, regular cooperation developed into a formalization of the quid pro quo. Condor supplemented collaborative covert operations with intelligence information-sharing as did ASEAN. Despite similar beginnings Condor does not have a military-security component. Condor was first an intelligence regime dedicated to clandestine operations against mutual enemies. It remained so until 1983 when the popular unrest ousted the Argentinean dictatorship. Condor had different tactics favoring targeted political assassination, kidnapping and torture rather then mutual targeting of insurgent groups through clandestine means while attacking by using military forces.

ASEAN nations kept their distance from hegemonic politics whereas Condor took advantage of the technology and expertise the U.S. was willing to provide in its fight against communism. McSherry (2002) states that US involvement was likely due to the perceived threat of communism on the continent. Revolutions, populism and nationalism were thought contrary to US interests as well as a challenge to stable South American governments. Condor’s brutality would send a message to those plotting regime change. Unified collaboration among intelligence agencies combined with US help would be unstoppable. Condor was a robust regime. Since intelligence cooperation among Southeast Asian nations exists under the larger strategic organization, ASEAN, there is an added layer of interaction, which solidifies trust. Condor stands on its own as an organization. 

EUROPOL’s formal nature is a result of the EU process and from its beginning was a codified set of norms and procedures about a specific task (Gregory 1998). This means that EUROPOL is also a product of neofunctionalism, a theory of supranational organization as applied to the political integration of European nations. Establishing an integrated policing organization with criminal intelligence cooperation at its core is another step towards that goal. The structure of the organization is regulated with only one small unit of national police personnel allowed in the organization. This unit links domestic intelligence on crimes and criminals to EUROPOL. Signatories of the treaty are also required to create (if they do not have such an organization already) a National Criminal Intelligence Facility to enable EUROPOL to conduct its tasks. In order to function properly these facilities need to develop credibility in their sourcing.  EUROPOL is also tasked with conducting joint operations against known threats.

The functions and tasks of EUROPOL are almost completely separate from issues of national security excepting the possibility of operations against terrorist organizations. But on this issue the EUROPOL treaty is unclear whether or not national governments are to take action themselves or to delegate. One can imagine that this type of intelligence would be shared through more direct national intelligence channels and not handed over to a multi-national body unless absolutely necessary. On this subject Gregory (1998) does not elaborate. There is a limited amount of data on the tempo of EUROPOL operations and it has only existed operationally since 1999.

Compared to ASEAN and Condor, EUROPOL is a highly regulated intelligence organization based on a legal framework. It was created to fulfill similar goals. Transnational threats are the common theme in the formation and successes of both ASEAN and Condor; EUROPOL, as well, has at its core the mission to stop transnational crime.  

Over time, however, changes in the Asian strategic environment increased Sino-Indian and Sino-Russian relations. Likewise, Pakistan became a useful ally to the U.S. in its operations against Soviet expansion into Afghanistan. New strategic challenges brought new friends, which strained the special relationship. Today, intelligence sharing is thought to be subordinate to military arms sales, not an integral part of diplomacy or defense initiatives as in the case of ASEAN. The Sino-Pakistani relationship illustrates the fragility of intelligence cooperation in the face of geopolitical changes. Cooperation on the level of covert operations may be a strong aggregate for bilateral ties as in the case of ASEAN but it is at the mercy of realist politics. The case could be made that where there are mutual interests there the likelihood of intelligence cooperation increases but does not necessarily suggest strong relations in the future. The “special relationship” is also less formal than Operation Condor. At no time was there a formal treaty level arrangement. This suggests that neither party predicted long-term concordance in foreign policy.

Nevertheless, a sizable body of literature exists to give a rough picture of broad trends in the life cycles of intelligence arrangements among covert allies. Most written accounts are cases studies on specific bilateral or multilateral arrangements; little if any analysis exists on trends, conclusions or predictions of when alliances occur or what form they may take. Future study on this subject will require constant searching for newly classified documentation on once classified operations so it can be applied to theory. Regime theory lends itself to explanations of covert alliances. Organizations like Operation Condor are not created in the image of collective strategic defense frameworks, as some realist scholars would suggest. On the other hand, ASEAN became precisely that. Additional case studies from a variety of sources combined with strong theoretical analysis may better explain current relationships between foreign intelligence agencies.