Knowing only what is available in the public domain, one is forced to consider the logic that went into making this decision. When considering a military operation, planners always assign a value to the objective. In the case of our activity in Syria, one has to question the value of that objective. Assuming there aren’t any other classified elements to this operation yet to be revealed, it does not look likely this military offensive was worth it. If this had been Osama bin Laden, maybe the answer would be different. But then consider how little of an impact both the capture and killing of Saddam Hussein and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had on the Iraqi insurgency.

U.S. officials have only admitted that the attack successfully killed Abu Ghadiya, an individual thought to be facilitating the transportation of insurgents and money across the border into Iraq. It has also been widely reported that Ghadiya was about to carry out an attack in Iraq and that the American strike was, in essence, a preemptive move. Syria has, of course, refuted these claims. Giving American intelligence officials the benefit of the doubt (and it doesn’t take a stretch of the imagination to assume militants are operating out of Syria), one is forced to ask a simple question: Was the cross-border killing of Abu Ghadiya worth spending a considerable amount of already-sparse international credibility? The answer seems to be a resounding no.

 There are negative implications, too, for our own credibility abroad. The United States roundly criticized Russia for its incursion into Georgia following Georgian attacks on South Ossetian forces and Russian peacekeepers. We have also put increasing pressure on Turkey to cease military incursions into northern Iraq, from where Kurdish separatists have been operating for decades. And yet, we feel free to engage in cross-border incursions into Pakistan or Syria. Granted, we have not used the levels of force of either Turkey or Russia, this still presents a very difficult problem for our other objectives in the region and around the world.

Take, for example, our ongoing negotiations with Iran regarding its nuclear program. This latest move into Syria gives more justification to Iran’s demand for a nonaggression pact to be part of its deal to give up uranium enrichment. This is the exact reason they have watched with a wary eye the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and cited their security concerns as justification for nuclear development. Iranian support for Shiite militias in Iraq is a problem but one that might be well worth solving through diplomatic discussion. This is an option the Bush administration shot down when it rejected any possibility of bilateral talks with Iran over Iraqi security issues. One might even consider extending the impact to ongoing talks with North Korea. The Kim Jong-Il regime, too, touts self defense from a hegemonic U.S. presence as its reason for pursuing nuclear weapons.

Aside from the continued concern this kind of move projects to other countries, it also makes one wonder whether the U.S.-led security development in Iraq is prioritized correctly. There is little doubt that militants sympathetic to al Qaeda are operating out of Syria or that Shiite militias are operating from Iran. The issue of border security was discussed as far back as 2004, when then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld lamented the lack of Syrian cooperation. The question is, are cross-border attacks the best way to tackle this ongoing security issue? Putting aside for a moment the diplomatic options (summits with neighboring states, international pressure on Iran and Syria, the imposition of U.N. sanctions, etc.) a far more effective strategy involves stabilizing the still very porous borders of Iraq from within. The Iraqi Department of Border Enforcement, and by extension the Ministry of the Interior, needs to receive at least some fraction of the attention that the broader Iraqi National Army has received. The greater concern over the past two years has been suppressing a growing domestic insurgency but there will need to be more attention put on what feeds that insurgency, which in part is due to cross-border flow from Iran and Syria.

Ultimately, the legitimacy of the American voice is reduced across the board by this latest attack in Syria, continuing raids in Pakistan, and our continued insistence on a self-declared right to preventive engagement. Whether we are denouncing cross-border raids by others or pushing rogue states to denuclearize, we cannot speak with the same degree of integrity that we might have had some years ago. And unfortunately, compromise and negotiation, the kind needed with Iran, North Korea, Russia and others, hinge on that integrity.

Alex LeFevre interned at the Center for Strategic and International Studies South Asia Program, where he co-authored a paper on the shifting relations between India and China. He holds a B.A. in International Affairs from The George Washington University.